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Background: In response to several high profile public health crises, public health renewal is underway in Canada.
In the province of British Columbia, the Ministry of Health initiated a collaborative evidence-informed process
involving a steering committee of representatives from the six health authorities. A Core Functions (CF) Framework
was developed, identifying 21 core public health programs. For each core program, an evidence review was
conducted and a model core program paper developed. These documents were distributed to health authorities to
guide development of their own renewed public health services. The CF implementation was conceptualized as an
embedded knowledge translation process. A CF coordinator in each health authority was to facilitate a gap analysis
and development of a performance improvement plan for each core program, and post these publically on the
health authority website.
Methods: Interviews (n = 19) and focus groups (n = 8) were conducted with a total of 56 managers and front line
staff from five health authorities working in the Healthy Living and Sexually Transmitted Infection Prevention core
programs. All interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded, transcribed and verified by the project
coordinator. Five members of the research team used NVivo 9 to manage data and conducted a thematic analysis.
Results: Four main themes emerged concerning implementation of the CF Framework generally, and the two
programs specifically. The themes were: ‘you’ve told me what, now tell me how’; ‘the double bind’; ‘but we already
do that’; and the ‘selling game.’ Findings demonstrate the original vision of the CF process was lost in the
implementation process and many participants were unaware of the CF framework or process.
Conclusions: Results are discussed with respect to a well-known framework on the adoption, assimilation, and
implementation of innovations in health services organizations. Despite attempts of the Ministry of Health and the
Steering Committee to develop and implement a collaborative, evidence-informed policy intervention, there were
several barriers to the realization of the vision for core public health functions implementation, at least in the early
stages. In neglecting the implementation process, it seems unlikely that the expected benefits of the public health
renewal process will be realized.
Keywords: Core public health functions, Public health reform, Implementation, Knowledge translation* Correspondence: dallan@uvic.ca
1University of Victoria, School of Nursing, P.O. Box 1700 STN CSC, Victoria,
British Columbia, Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2013 Tomm-Bonde et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Tomm-Bonde et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:59 Page 2 of 11
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/8/1/59Background
There is longstanding unease in Canada about the ad-
equacy of public health infrastructure to address major
public health concerns [1,2]. In the early 21st century,
several public health emergencies highlighted the need
for public health reform. In particular, water contami-
nation events [3] and the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Toronto [4] drove home
the need for public health renewal [5]. The centerpiece
of the province of British Columbia’s (BC) approach to
reform is a Framework for Core Functions in Public
Health (CF Framework) [6]. It identifies the basic public
health services and supports that Health Authorities
(HA) are expected to provide to their communities
(see Additional file 1).
The launch of this Framework provided the impetus
for developing a research program, Core Public Health
Functions Research Initiative (CPHFRI) [7], to study the
implementation and impact of public health system re-
newal in BC and beyond. CPHFRI includes the Renewal
of Public Health Systems (RePHS) project in which we
study the implementation of the CF Framework in BC
and the Public Health Standards in Ontario (ON),
through two exemplar core public health programs:
sexually transmitted infection prevention (STIP) and
chronic disease prevention, known in BC as healthy liv-
ing (HL). The findings reported in this paper are derived
from RePHS BC phase one data on the introduction and
early implementation of the CF Framework and the two
core programs from the perspectives of public health
managers and practitioners.
Implementation and knowledge translation
Implementation has been generally studied as a compo-
nent of a larger change process, such as the diffusion of
innovations [8,9]. Implementation refers to a process of
translating intentions into action with many possible
outcomes, including degrees of both successful and
unsuccessful implementation [10,11]. These intentions
are reflected in policies, plans, technologies, programs,
and innovations. In public health, like other areas of
healthcare, there has been movement toward evidence-
based practice, programs, and policies [12], and several
terms have emerged to describe the process by which
evidence is translated into practice, such as knowledge
translation (KT), knowledge transfer, and knowledge
exchange [13].
The KT literature, which has grown considerably since
2000, overlaps with older implementation literature.
Both KT and implementation theory are about putting
knowledge into practice, but KT is explicitly focused on
research evidence and the relationship between re-
searchers and knowledge users. The older implementa-
tion literature focuses more on implementing innovations,policies, and programs, and influences on that process.
Both bodies of literature inform our analysis.
From their meta-narrative systematic review of the di-
verse literature across 13 research traditions on diffusion
of innovations in healthcare organizations, Greenhalgh
et al. [8] developed a comprehensive conceptual frame-
work of factors influencing dissemination, adoption, im-
plementation, and sustainability. The main categories of
influence on these include: the nature of the innovation;
system antecedents for innovation; communication and
influence; the outer context; the inner context; system
readiness for innovation; characteristics of the adopters;
and the implementation process. In this framework, im-
plementation is one stage in the entire diffusion process,
but factors influencing each stage are not distinct and
influence all stages.
There is widespread acknowledgement of the import-
ance of evidence-based practice and policy, yet the
research-practice gap remains a significant problem
[14,15]. Theories, frameworks, and models have been de-
veloped to guide and explain the implementation and
KT process [8,15-18]. KT is a process of closing the gap
between the evidence generated in research and its ap-
plication for frontline health systems delivery [19]. Here,
‘application’ or what we call ‘implementation’ is consid-
ered part of the KT process. Unfortunately, implementa-
tion and KT frameworks have not been used widely by
organizations prospectively to plan implementation of
new policies or programs [16,18]. We know that few
policies and programs in the ‘real world’ are fully
implemented as intended [20], but we do not know how
the use of KT or implementation frameworks might im-
prove the process.
In recognition of this challenge, the BC Ministry of
Health developed a Core Functions Implementation
Process [21] to guide the implementation of the Core
Functions Framework [6] in BC, which can be under-
stood as an embedded KT process. In other words, KT
was integrated into the policy intervention itself as illus-
trated below.
The core functions implementation process—embedded
knowledge translation
A provincial steering committee was created to develop,
oversee, and guide the CF framework implementation.
This committee, composed of Ministry and HA repre-
sentatives, commissioned and approved evidence reviews
for each of the core programs. Provincial teams, which
included HA representatives, used the evidence reviews
to develop 21 model core program papers (MCPP). At
this point, responsibility for implementation was turned
over to HAs. Leaders within each HA were identified for
each core program and they convened working groups
to conduct gap analyses in which existing services were
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described in the MCPPs. The working groups were to
develop performance improvement plans (PIPs) to im-
plement the MCPP strategies that addressed identified
gaps in service. If the HA was already implementing
some of the best practices described, they could con-
tinue to offer those services if other priorities were not
identified and implement new services to address gaps.
Expectations for Framework implementation were
communicated to the HAs via a General Letter of Ex-
pectation (GLE) from the Ministry. Given that public
health services represent only a small part of services
provided by HAs, they were not the major focus of the
GLE. Once HAs conducted their gap analyses and deve-
loped PIPs, these were to be made publically available
on each HA’s website.
Purpose of study
The implementation of this major policy initiative was
expected to have a significant impact on public health
practice in the province, in part through its embedded
KT process.
Few implementation studies have focussed explicitly
on developing a qualitative understanding of the experi-
ences of those who are actually involved at the front
lines. In this paper, we focus on presenting the perspec-
tives of those responsible for implementation on the
ground. Specifically, we explore the collective experi-
ences of HA managers and front line staff with the early
implementation of the CF Framework within the STIP
and HL exemplar programs in BC. An analysis of the
differences between HAs and specific subgroups of par-
ticipants is beyond the scope of this paper and will be
presented in subsequent publications. First, we present
a thematic analysis, and then discuss findings in rela-
tion to key influences on implementation drawing on
Greenhalgh et al.’s framework on the diffusion of in-
novations in health service organizations [8]. Know-
ledge about the implementation experience and the
challenges encountered by practitioners and managers
may help inform improvements in both the policy
intervention and the implementation process.
Methods
Sampling
The data used for this paper were obtained during phase
one of the larger RePHS project (see Additional file 1 for
a description of the overall research project and its
methodology). We conducted interviews and focus
groups with BC public health practitioners and man-
agers involved in STIP and HL about their early imple-
mentation experiences. Consistent with most qualitative
research methodologies, we used purposive sampling
[22]. A key representative within each HA extended aninvitation to participate to managers and front line staff
who had experience with planning or delivery of STIP or
HL. If interested, representatives contacted the research
team directly.Data collection
Questions were based on sensitizing concepts from
Greenhalgh et al.’s framework as described previously
[8] and reviewed for relevance and wording with know-
ledge user partners. Topics included: knowledge about
the CF Framework and STIP/HL implementation, how
evidence informed practice, integration of an equity lens
into STIP/HL activities, public health governance, lea-
dership, partnerships, and contextual influences on each
of these. Interviews lasted approximately 90 minutes.
Similar interview guides were used for both interviews
and focus groups.
For pragmatic reasons (e.g., HA size and staff work-
load), as suggested by knowledge user partners, we
conducted focus groups with front line staff, and indivi-
dual interviews with managers. From November 2010 to
June 2011, individual interviews (n = 19) and focus
groups (n = 8) were conducted with a total of 56 HL and
STIP managers and front line staff from four of five re-
gional HAs and the provincial HA. Data collection was
conducted in-person (five interviews, six focus groups)
or by teleconference (14 interviews, two focus groups)
based on HA preference. Ethics approval for the larger
project was received from the University of Victoria and
each participating HA. A review of interview and focus
group data suggest that the data were similar in depth
and scope, although individual focus group responses
were shorter than interview responses. However, focus
group participants built on other participants’ responses,
resulting in a collective response to each question simi-
lar in detail to those of individual interviewees.Analysis
Interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded,
transcribed verbatim and verified. We conducted a the-
matic analysis using NVivo 9.0 to manage the data. The
team listened repeatedly to audiotapes, and read tran-
scriptions of the interviews and focus groups [23]. We
inductively coded the data using the constant compara-
tive method [22,24] beginning with line-by-line coding,
ultimately aggregating codes at higher levels of abstrac-
tion. Analysts wrote memos throughout, recording in-
sights and making notes about relationships among the
emerging categories, later verifying these in the data.
Several coders analyzed the same interviews and deve-
loped an initial coding framework to be used by the
whole team for coding subsequent interviews. The co-
ding framework evolved as analysis progressed, facilitated
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ging themes and resolve discrepancies in coding.
Knowledge users on the research team provided feedback
throughout the process which helps to ensure that findings
are accurate and credible [25]. The themes described below
have been presented to and discussed with HA team mem-
bers and research participants in several venues.
Results
Four main themes emerged regarding participant experi-
ences with implementation of the CF Framework and the
two core programs. The themes were: ‘you’ve told me what,
now tell me how’; ‘the double bind’; ‘but we already do that’;
and ‘the selling game.’ We discuss each of the themes with
illustrative quotations. We applied gender-neutral pseudo-
nyms to quotations to protect confidentiality and edited
quotations slightly to enhance readability and meaning
(e.g., removal of instances of um and repetitive phrases).
You’ve told me what, now tell me how
The CF Framework was designed to be a guide, not leg-
islated. The public health renewal process was collabora-
tive involving representatives from government, HAs,
and other stakeholders. The government acted in a stew-
ardship role, responsible for overseeing but not directing
the process. Because the HAs in BC operate as inde-
pendent organizations, the vision was that each would
implement programs according to their unique govern-
ance structures, population needs, and resources. HAs
were asked to conduct gap analyses and develop PIPs for
each of the core programs, using the evidence reviews
and MCPPs. Shifting responsibility for implementation
from the provincial to the HA level meant involving
more, and different, individuals in the CF process. Some
people assisting at this point were not involved in earlier
stages of the framework process, yet were now being
asked to assess the current state of services and develop
new plans. Many claimed not to have a clear under-
standing of the vision, intent, or meaning of the Frame-
work or the implementation process. Their focus was on
completing the gap analysis and PIP without really
knowing how these activities fit into the larger vision of
the framework. They felt as though they were going
through the motions of implementation without under-
standing why, as reported by this manager:
‘I don’t know, maybe because in the past I’ve been
involved in doing their [the Ministry’s] research and
pulling this together and being very specific about
why we’re doing something. Whereas this way, the
papers are already written and you are just sort of
relying on what you get. I know this sounds really
odd. But if someone else is doing it for you and then
you’re rolling it out.’ (Chris, Manager)This participant is suggesting that there is something in-
appropriate about practitioners who are not involved in
the development of the plan being responsible for rolling
out someone else’s plan. In such a situation, it is possible
that the commitment needed to implement as intended
is missing. Without an understanding of the larger vi-
sion, more questions than answers arose in determining
how to operationalize programs. For example, partici-
pants raised questions such as: ‘Is my staff responsible
for this? What are common indicators across the region
and province and shouldn’t we be working towards
these? How are other HAs doing this? Some of the activ-
ities that we do, cross into other core programs, so how
do we deal with that? If we can’t do everything in the
MCPP, where should we focus our attention?’ They per-
ceived a lack of guidance in answering their questions.
As one participant put it:
‘And it just seemed crazy to me that the provincial
government was unrolling something without
consultation with them [front line staff]. And so
they [the staff] have to wait to see what they are
doing but how, if they haven’t consulted with them.
I mean they’ve never consulted with us to see what
they do for obesity prevention in schools and, you
know, you just think—who’s actually on the ground?’
(Charlie, Front-line staff )
Clearly, some staff felt left out of the process despite
their belief that they had important contributions to
make. Although participants thought a few front line
staff may have been involved in the process, there was
concern that this was inadequate because of the variety
of roles and the inability of one person to reflect accur-
ately the diversity of front line perspectives.
Some participants reported that many people in their
organization had never heard of the CF Framework. For
example, one participant said, .’…what was interesting,
you know, talking about model core programs and
people didn’t know what I was talking about’ (Cameron,
Manager). It appeared that the philosophical vision and
intents were not adequately communicated throughout
the organization, nor were these staff members engaged
in a process to develop a shared vision. Thus, the ‘how’
of implementation became somewhat irrelevant in rela-
tion to the vision of the Framework. Instead, they fo-
cussed on what they thought they needed to do rather
than understanding how or why.
The double bind
Those working in HAs were asked to implement 21 core
programs with few, if any, additional resources to sup-
port the endeavour. If additional resources were avail-
able, this was not evident to all managers and front line
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and complexity of the Framework’s implementation and
struggled to find strategies to make it more manageable.
Most HAs responded by clustering core programs into
related groups. For example, in one HA, infant and child
health was bundled with reproductive health, while HL
and healthy communities were clustered with mental
health promotion and preventing the harms of substance
use. Others clustered programs into age-related group-
ings. The intent was to reduce the number of programs
to a manageable number or to consolidate services pro-
vided to specific population groups.
In struggling to comprehend the scale of the public
health renewal project, some participants searched for
supports and resources to help them. Many stated that
public health budgets (and departments) were cut,
resulting in job losses, non-replacement of vacant posi-
tions, and shrinking programs, rather than the hoped-for
expansion and renewal of public health. As one manager
noted, it was a challenge implementing core programs in
light of organizational cost cutting measures at the same
time that other public health crises were emerging:
‘But then all these things in the past year and a half
have happened that make that process [i.e.,
implementation] so much harder and make things
take so much longer. So instead of, ‘it’s no problem to
get a gap analysis and performance improvement plan
done in a year,’ now things can take quite a bit longer.
There is just kind of one impact after another. So
right after I started there was fiscal restraint because
of the economic times we were in, so we had quite a
lot of budget cuts so people lost their jobs and we
couldn’t travel. So that hampers getting teams
together when you can’t travel and then people are
losing their positions that were maybe a lead for a
core program or who were a significant personnel on
that team and that changes the make-up of your team
and the ability to get it done. And then H1N1
happened....’ (Casey, Manager)
Participants perceived that with budget cuts there was
little hope of HAs putting into place an effective imple-
mentation strategy and that this magnified the inad-
equate surge capacity of the system to deal with public
health emergencies, such as the H1N1 epidemic. In the
face of such crises, other public health programs got put
on hold.
Without access to financial and other resources, many
did not find administrative support for the CF process,
seeing a mismatch between the stated intentions of the
Ministry and the means for implementing public health
renewal. Being responsible for changes without having
the means to enact them put managers in a double bindand left people feeling frustrated and burdened. Many
felt that public health, in particular, was being unfairly
targeted for budget cuts, as reflected below:
‘But I think for me, one of the issues has been the
pressure on the limited resources and I’m still not
clear why they always pick on the little guy right?
And that seems to be, whether people believe that
the money is more available [in public health],
I don’t know why you’d pick on the area that has
the least amount of dollars. I can remember when
one of my directors, I said to him, ‘Instead of just
taking little bits from me, why don’t you just take the
whole program because you’re talking about, you
know, if we have deficits of a program, this may be
5 or 6 million. Well if you have to cut that much just
wipe it out ‘cause that’s what you’re doing on a
gradual basis. You’re letting us kind of haemorrhage.
You may as well take it away.” (Jamie, Manager)
Even in places where implementation began well, and
the gap analyses and PIPs were completed in a timely
fashion, not having adequate resources to see it through
hampered the process and demoralized practitioners.
Some sought direction regarding which, if any, of the
21 programs were a priority within the HA, but did not
find much guidance. Many respondents suggested that
they were unable to determine priorities because these
were shifting within government. At the time the CF
framework was introduced and people in HAs were
awaiting a government announcement on the HL core
program, people talked about the negative impacts of
the H1N1 pandemic, a provincial election, an economic
downturn, and restructuring within HAs. The ‘change
fatigue’ they reported was a significant barrier to imple-
mentation. Although work on core functions continued
in some HAs, in other cases the implementation of some
core programs was put on hold while waiting for guid-
ance about priorities and the necessary resources to
carry through with it.
As a consequence, staff in some HAs made their own
priority assessments. In the perceived absence of Minis-
try and HA leadership and funding in support of core
functions, they believed that full implementation of the
vision of the CF Framework was severely hampered, as
implied by this front-line staff member:
‘Just in terms of the core functions, we would hope that
there’s some bite to the actual functions. Like, just
putting up policy is not helpful. There needs to be dollars
attached to the policy and there needs to be buy in from
management. Then it’s helpful to us. Then they feel the
impetus to give us the information and knowledge
translation is improved.’ (Reese, Front-line staff)
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Although the vision of the framework was to define the
core public health functions that HAs should be ad-
dressing, as well as to provide relevant evidence and
guidelines for what should be included within each core
program, to many participants, the framework meant
starting from scratch and implementing a new program.
The Ministry and steering committee never envisioned
that all current programs would cease and new ones
begin and yet, that message never filtered down to many
of those engaged in gap analyses or program implemen-
tation. In talking about this problem, on participant said:
‘The information, it hasn’t been very clear and it
hasn’t been big picture, and I think a lot of people
have been, need the big picture to get the small
picture’ (Quinn, Front-line staff ).
Some staff questioned the intent of core functions be-
cause to them CF implementation meant that the good
work they were already doing was not being acknowl-
edged. For example, one participant noted,.‘I would
argue that we were already implementing best practices’
(Eden, Manager). Although some participants did
recognize that the intention was about making sure the
gaps were covered and, if necessary, services were en-
hanced, they did not believe that others understood this,
as reflected below:
‘I think what was missing was a strong awareness of
how core functions is a part of everything that we do
in the HAs and how the core functions evidence can
be used to support planning and decision-making and
how it doesn’t have to be a project that’s separate
from all of the other work. It’s actually integrated with
all the other work and supporting the other work and
vice versa. So that to me was kind of the big thing.’
(Sidney, Manager)
Many participants did not recognize the connection
between their current programming and the intentions
of the CF Framework. Repeatedly, we heard participants
say that they were already providing the services
outlined in the MCPPs without understanding that the
intent was never to start from scratch. For example, in
reference to STIP, one manager noted:
‘And you know, while sitting here and thinking, like,
why haven’t we focused on this with our core function
work that we have done, I think it is because it is a
good program already in place. So I think that is
probably one of the reasons why STIP probably hasn’t
made it into any of the implementation plans of core
function groups.’ (Morgan, Manager)The theme ‘But we already do that’ suggests that many
participants believed that best practices were already in
place and thus could not understand why a new frame-
work or core program was needed. Clearly, the intent of
the CF Framework was neither understood by, nor expli-
citly communicated to, all staff and this led to lack of
commitment to the entire process by some staff.
The selling game
A major challenge to implementation noted by partici-
pants was competing HA priorities. When decisions had
to be made, some participants said that everything asso-
ciated with the CF Framework fell to the bottom of the
list. This was because they perceived no consequences
from the Ministry for non-implementation and that on-
going resources beyond the initial funding were not pro-
vided either by the Ministry or the HAs. The political
will within the HA to implement the Framework was
not always there, as this participant explained:
‘So they [HA employees], so they like that [the vision
of the CF Framework] in principle. [They] like, the
concept of it, being able to show that we’re all in this
together. But I think that people recognize that
change is political, and the political will wasn’t there,
you know, in the organization. So there was always
scepticism as to whether it would be implemented.’
(Pat, Manager).
The process thus became a marketing exercise for
those responsible for implementation in which they
‘polished the rhetoric’ to produce buy-in from others to
work on the program, be committed to the process, and
move forward despite all of the odds stacked against
them. This participant explains her experience:
‘It’s already kind of a selling game. You have to [tell
them], you know, why is this important? Why are we
doing this? And yes we are mandated to do the core
programs, but why is this actually going to help your
work and improve our services to our clients? You
kind of have to sell that because everyone is so busy
and people are not going to give up another part of
their job to do this work. It is an added on part of
their work right, so it’s making that sell and then we
can work on this for six months and not sure where it
will go, right?’ (Leslie, Manager)
The purpose of the selling game was to generate sup-
port in HA areas outside of public health for a policy
that did not appear to carry the same political weight as
other government or HA initiatives. Participants saw no
guarantee that work done now would still be relevant in
six months. Thus, getting buy-in in an ever-changing
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of selling the work associated with the program. To
make it work, however, participants believed that there
needed to be strong leadership at all levels in the
organization, not only in supporting CF implementation,
but also in advocating for the role of public health
within the HA. One participant summed this up well:
‘I think that the leadership style needs to be
collaborative and inclusive and then what I mean by
that is reaching out to other programs outside of public
health and making the links for them. Like why core
programs is important. How it can help support them
in the work they are already doing. Why it benefits the
populations we serve to be integrating this evidence
and these practices into our work. So, it needs to be
someone who understands the importance of that and
who is willing to make time for that. Cause it’s time-
consuming. It’s about conversations really, and
relationships.’ (Jessie, Manager)
Communicating a vision is an important leadership
tool for implementation. In some instances, the ma-
nagers’ sales pitch to front line staff may not have in-
cluded the vision, but instead focused on the gap
analysis and the PIP. Without understanding the vision,
it was difficult for mid-level managers and front-line
staff to understand or buy into the significance of these
activities. In other instances, however, there was no sales
pitch, so people were left to implement activities without
understanding why.
In summary, four themes emerged from the analysis
that explained participants’ experiences with implemen-
tation of the core programs. Although some participants
did report positive aspects of the CF process and frame-
work, overall, the introduction and early implementation
of the CF Framework was not wholeheartedly embraced
by many participants and resulted in what appeared to
be a rocky start to the CF process.
Discussion
The CF Framework was a comprehensive, evidence-
informed, collaborative initiative intended as an embed-
ded KT process to renew public health in BC. Many par-
ticipants saw value in this framework and acknowledged
the importance to public health. Nonetheless, we found
that many factors known to impede successful imple-
mentation were present at the time the CF Framework
was introduced in BC. Without addressing these chal-
lenges, the vision for public health renewal in this pro-
vince may not be realized.
One limitation of our analysis is that it draws only on
a subset of data being gathered to study the implementa-
tion of this policy intervention. We recognize, however,that implementation is often a long and protracted
process and that what influences the adoption and im-
plementation of innovations may change at different
points in the process [8]. Additional data gathered dur-
ing phase two (interviews with senior executives in the
HAs) and phase three (follow-up interviews with front
line staff and managers) may reveal that influences may
change as the implementation process evolves over time.
Greenhalgh et al. argue that ‘the success of implemen-
tation (and the chances of sustainability) are critically
dependent on the attributes of the innovation, the be-
haviour of individual adopters, the nature of communi-
cation and influence, and various structural and
sociological features of the organization and its wider
environment’ [8, p. 176]. In our discussion, we focus on
our empirically derived findings in relation to these ele-
ments of their framework.
Intervention characteristics
The important characteristics of the intervention that
appeared to influence early implementation include the
intervention source, relative advantage, complexity, and
reinvention. Perceptions that an intervention is deve-
loped externally, or is seen as centrally driven, can nega-
tively affect implementation success, particularly if there
is not a transparent decision-making process or there is
limited input from users [16,26]. Despite HA involve-
ment in developing the CF framework, some participants
were not aware of this and did not perceive that there
had been sufficient consultation with those responsible
for implementation. This appeared to result in a low
level of commitment to development and implementa-
tion of new practices from the MCPPs. Some perceived
the Framework as a directive from above, as reflected in
the theme ‘you’ve told me what, now tell me how.’
There must be a relative advantage of an innovation to
all stakeholders for successful implementation [8,9].
Many participants did not see a clear benefit of the CF
framework or MCPPs over current practice. In fact, they
believed the MCPPs reflected what they were already
doing (but we already do that!). The seeming similarity
of the MCPPs to what was already going on led some
participants to dismiss the MCPPs as redundant. Relative
advantage alone, however, is not sufficient for implementa-
tion. Innovations often go through a long period of negoti-
ation, meaning-making, contestation and reframing, all of
which may influence the perceived advantage of an
innovation and thus its adoption and implementation [8].
Because participants were at the beginning of this
protracted process, there are still opportunities for impro-
ving implementation over time.
The perceived complexity of an intervention will nega-
tively influence implementation [8]. If the innovation
can be reinvented (i.e., adapted or modified) then
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double bind’ many participants felt overwhelmed by the
complexity of the CF Framework and managed this by
clustering programs to reduce the demands of imple-
mentation. Whether this adaptation will improve the
success of implementation over the longer term remains
to be seen.
Outer context
Factors in the outer context influencing implementation
included: incentives and mandates at the provincial level,
and environmental stability. As described in ‘the selling
game,’ participants identified few incentives in support of
implementation. There was no strong mandate or polit-
ical directive to ensure implementation and evidence
suggests that such mandates are most effective when ac-
companied by a dedicated funding stream [27]. Overall,
there was limited accountability for action, no perceived
consequences for lack of implementation, and no
funding to support implementation. The requirement to
post the PIP publically was not tracked by the Ministry
and not enforced. Although a requirement for public
reporting can motivate compliance with directives in an
organization [28], not if there are adversarial relations
between the reporting entity and the organization to
which it is responsible [10]. Some participants perceived
the relationship between the Ministry and their HA as
adversarial.
Environmental stability or uncertainty can influence
the implementation process, although the evidence is
limited [29,30]. Changes in the external environment
have a much smaller influence than structural character-
istics of the organization [29]. Nonetheless, participants
talked about instability in the external environment cre-
ated by significant organizational restructuring in some
HAs, shifting policies and priorities of the provincial
government, a provincial election that put CF imple-
mentation on hold, and the H1N1 pandemic that
diverted both the resources and the practice of public
health away from CF implementation.
Inner context
In the inner or organizational context, influences on im-
plementation include: system antecedents for innovation,
i.e., structural characteristics of the organization and
a receptive context for change; and system readiness
for innovation, including tension for change and
innovation-system fit. Structural characteristics relate to
such things as functional differentiation or internal di-
vision of labor, and the centralization versus dispersion
of decision making [8,26]. Devolved decision making in
the organization to teams on the ground contributes to
successful implementation [30]. In this study, although
there were working groups who conducted gap analysesand developed PIPs, they did not necessarily have deci-
sion making authority around program implementation.
Front line staff, in particular, did not believe they had
decision making authority in this regard.
Prior to regionalization in BC in the 1990s, public
health units operated independently of the healthcare
system at large with strong public health leadership [31].
Public health budgets could never be raided by the acute
care system. Currently, public health is subsumed by the
regional HAs, each of which structures public health
somewhat differently [31]. That structure influences the
power and authority of public health leaders, as well as
the visibility and priority given to public health func-
tions. For example, in some HAs, there is no public
health representation at the senior executive table to
bring a public health voice to decision making. Medical
health officers in some HAs have no line authority or
control of budgets, nor do they make decisions about
core program implementation and the deployment of
public health staff. Participants perceived that, without
this, public health was marginalized and often invisible
within the system, and that public health was unfairly
targeted for cost cutting measures. This perception was
evident in the themes ‘you’ve told me what, now tell me
how’ and ‘the selling game.’
If an organization has a receptive context for change,
then it is more likely to embrace new ideas and support
the implementation of innovations [8,32]. Key compo-
nents of this context include strong leadership and a
clear and strategic vision [32,33]. Many participants per-
ceived a lack of strong public health leadership within
the organization. The lack of resources to implement
core functions adequately was seen by participants as a
concrete reflection of the lack of leadership to advocate
for the role of public health, and consequently the low
priority of public health in the system. Many participants
did not perceive that there was a strategic vision for CF
implementation in their HAs. If senior executives did
have a strategic vision, it was not well communicated to
front line staff and managers.
When practitioners believe they are already engaged in
best practices (but we’re already doing that!), leadership
may be important to push staff ‘to break out of the con-
vergent thinking and routines that are the norm in large
organizations’ [8, p. 13]. It may encourage staff to reflect
critically on whether they are truly implementing best
practices, or just engaged in business as usual.
Elements of system readiness for innovation included
tension for change, innovation-system fit, and relative
priority. Tension for change is the extent to which those
involved perceive the current situation as intolerable or
requiring change [34]. This can be fostered with effective
communication strategies that create dissatisfaction with
current practice, cultivate commitment, and reduce
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most participants’ experiences and we found no efforts
to cultivate tension. In fact, many believed that they
were already engaged in practices outlined in the MCPPs
(but we already do that!). Furthermore, participants were
already experiencing change fatigue with many new ini-
tiatives and rapidly shifting priorities, as reflected in the
theme ‘you’ve told me what, now tell me how.’ Commit-
ment to implementation was hard to muster when
people believed that six months down the road another
initiative would be announced, requiring yet another
change in their work.
Innovation-system fit
There is strong evidence that when there is a good fit
between the innovation and organizational values and
norms, people are more likely to embrace the innovation
[9,10,34]. Participants believed that they were already
engaged in best practices outlined in the MCPPs, and
they saw value and strength in the CF framework. This
suggests that there was already a good innovation-
system fit. Clearly, this was not sufficient for participants
to embrace wholeheartedly the CF framework. A shared
perception of the importance of the intervention’s im-
plementation within the organization and its relative pri-
ority predicts implementation effectiveness. When staff
members perceive that implementation is a key orga-
nizational priority, and it is promoted, supported, and
rewarded, then a climate in support of implementation
is strong [10,35]. In ‘the selling game’, participants made
it clear that they did not perceive core program imple-
mentation as a priority in the organization, relative to
competing priorities.
Communication and influence
Intra-organizational networks and communications are
important influences on successful implementation. So-
cial networks support knowledge circulation in an
organization. Support for teamwork is therefore import-
ant to facilitate the development of shared meaning,
values, and vision in regard to the innovation [8]. This
requires stable teams over time. In the theme ‘you’ve
told me what, now tell me how,’ it is evident that teams
were not stable and that staff changes greatly affected
how people understood the intervention and their role
within it.
It is possible that effective communication strategies
might have mitigated these effects. We know that com-
munication across the organization is essential for effect-
ive implementation [36]. In general, staff members need
to be well-informed, and to understand the mission and
goals of an intervention if implementation is to be suc-
cessful [8]. It is evident that many participants did nothave an understanding of the vision, intent, or meaning
of the CF framework or the implementation process. A
more consistent and organization-wide communication
strategy might have better set the stage for subsequent
implementation, perhaps by helping to create tension
for change. There is some evidence to support a narra-
tive approach to communication across the organization
[37] in which a ‘purposive construction of a shared and
emergent organizational story of ‘what we are doing
with this innovation’ can serve as a powerful cue to
action’ [8, p. 15].
Implementation process
Greenhalgh et al.’s framework identifies the following
leadership and management factors as important in en-
hancing implementation: top management support and
advocacy of the implementation process, alignment of
the innovation with the goals of top and middle manage-
ment, and active engagement of leaders in the process.
As reflected in ‘you’ve told me what now tell me how’,
‘the double bind’, ‘and the selling game’, it was clear that
many participants did not perceive top management
support of, advocacy for, or engagement in the imple-
mentation process. Participants suggested that the goals
of upper level management in the HAs do not align with
the goals of public health or the CF Framework. Some
participants believe this is because of public health’s
marginal position in the larger healthcare system, or be-
cause of the lack of a public health voice at the executive
table. The minimal emphasis on public health deliverables
in the General Letter of Expectation from the Ministry
supports this contention.
Implementation is enhanced by early and extensive in-
volvement of staff at all levels supported by formal facili-
tation efforts [8]. These might include, for example,
high-quality training materials and on-the-job training
[34]. Our data illustrate that there was almost no in-
volvement of front line staff in the CF development
process and limited manager involvement. No one men-
tioned training for implementing HL and STIP pro-
grams; perhaps because ‘they were already doing that’,
they did not feel a need for training.
There is limited evidence to support specific KT
interventions, but we know that change is more likely
when KT and implementation interventions are
planned and targeted to specific programs and audi-
ences and are implemented systematically and consis-
tently across the organization [14,38]. Although some
HAs may have used KT strategies to support core pro-
gram implementation, we could not identify these for
HL and STIP. If KT interventions were developed, par-
ticipants were not aware of them, they were not wide-
spread across the organizations, nor did they appear to
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prehensive way.Summary and conclusions
The CF Framework was implemented in a complex, dy-
namic environment that presented significant challenges.
It seems that insufficient accountability and inadequate
leadership beyond public health prevented many of those
responsible for implementation from doing that work and
made it difficult to make it a priority. Without adequate
resources, the CF Framework was perceived as a low pri-
ority, and in a chaotic environment with many competing
priorities and decreasing budgets, the CF Framework be-
came marginalized. The lack of consequences for the HAs
in not implementing the programs reinforced this. Be-
cause there was no senior public health decision maker
represented at the executive table in some HAs, it was dif-
ficult to promote public health renewal and secure ad-
equate resources when higher priority was accorded to
acute care and other institutionally-based health services.
There were no implementation plans developed at the
health authority level for such a major intervention,
resulting in poor communication of the vision and intent
of the Framework among staff at or near the front lines.
There appeared to be no opportunities for staff and man-
agers to consult on, or participate in developing a shared
vision for the CF Framework, thus they did not feel par-
ticularly invested in the process.
The lesson to be learned is that implementation is the
Achilles heel of innovation. While the Ministry of Health
invested significant resources in conducting evidence re-
views for all the core public health programs, they did
not synthesize the evidence on factors influencing effect-
ive implementation of a complex policy intervention like
the CF Framework. Unfortunately, available implementa-
tion frameworks [8,14,16-18] are rarely used prospect-
ively to plan for implementation [16,18]. Rather, they are
used primarily as we have used Greenhalgh et al.’s
framework—retrospectively to analyze the influences on
implementation.
Our main recommendation is that the implementation
of any intervention requires a well developed implemen-
tation plan, guided by a comprehensive implementation
framework to identify and address potential barriers and
facilitators for the process. This includes involvement of
staff that will be responsible for implementation in the
process. Evaluation is essential to determine whether the
prospective use of an implementation framework will in-
fluence successful implementation. There must be an in-
vestment of sufficient resources, not just for the
activities of the intervention, but also to support the im-
plementation process. The return on this investment is
likely to be substantial.Consent
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